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Equity in the fiscal benefits associated with private health expenditures in 
Portugal: 2000 - 2010 
Abstract 
The objectives of this work project are to, a) provide an analysis on the extent of 
progressivity of the fiscal benefits associated with private health expenses in Portugal 
between 2000 and 2010, and b) assess the equity implications of a reduction of these 
fiscal benefits proposed by the Memorandum of Understanding. Using the methodology 
of concentration and Kakwani progressivity indices, the fiscal benefits was found to be 
pro-rich during this period with a progressivity index of -0.213 in 2010. A simulation of 
a reduction of these fiscal benefits estimated that these fiscal benefits will become pro-
poor for the fiscal year 2013 with a progressivity index of 0.335. 
Keywords: Fiscal benefits, private health expenses, Kakwani index, MoU 
I. Introduction 
One of the main objectives of the National Health System (SNS) in Portugal is 
to promote equity in access to health care, as well as in the finance of health care 
payments. With respect to the finance of health care, promotion of equity is vital as to 
not financially burden the economically disadvantaged individuals. Bearing this in 
mind, equity in the finance of health care payments should be based on the individual´s 
ability to pay, regardless of his/her economic position (van Doorslaer et al 1993). 
However, Wagstaff et al (1999) shows that the finance of total health care payments are 
regressive in Portugal.
1
 This implies that the poorer individuals pay a higher proportion 
for health care in relation to their income, than richer individuals. The main reasons for 
this situation are due to the high proportion of the so-called private health expenses 
                                                 
1
 This paper is the most recent analysis on the equity in the finance of the total health care payments, with 
comparisons with other nations. The analysis is based on data for 1990. 
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(PHE) which in turn are highly regressive,
2
 and the fiscal deductions associated with 
such payments which not only decrease the progressivity of the income tax, but also 
reduce equity in the finance of health care as a result of richer households obtaining 
more of the benefits associated with these fiscal deductions (Pinto and Santos 1993; 
Pereira and Sousa 2001; CSFSNS 2007).
3
 
Private health expenses are one of the major sources of the finance of health care 
in Portugal.
4
 Figure 1 below compares Portugal with other European nations with 
respect to PHE as a percentage of total health care expenditure for the years 2000 and 
2010. 
Source: WHO World Health Statistics 2013. 
As we can see from the figure above, PHE plays an important source of finance 
of health care in Portugal. In 2010 it contributed to about 34% of total health care 
expenditure, with only Switzerland and Greece reaching higher values. In fact PHE as a 
                                                 
2
 Private health expenses are those health payments directly paid by the consumer at the time of receiving 
the particular health care. See Wagstaff et al (1999), as well as section IV in this work project for a 
comparison of the progressivity indices of these payments with other nations. 
3
 The taxpayer is able to reduce the amount of tax he/she owes by deducting a portion or all of its PHE. 
“Fiscal benefits” and “fiscal deduction” are used interchangeably throughout this work project. 
4
 Private health expenses are broken down into out-of-pocket health payments, and private health 
insurance. These form the majority of the total private expenditure on health care. Other sources include 
direct and indirect taxes, as well as social insurance, which form the bulk of public expenditure on health 
care in Portugal. 
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share of total health care payments in Portugal is higher than the European average. 
Previous papers (Pereira and Pinto 1992; Pinto and Santos 1993; Pereira 1996; Pereira 
and Sousa 2001; CSFSNS 2007) have documented that not only do PHE play a major 
role in the finance of health care in Portugal, but that these payments were regressive 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover as mentioned above in Wagstaff (1999), the 
regressive nature of these payments contribute to the overall regressivity of the total 
finance of health care in Portugal. The main reason for the regressivity of PHE is due to 
the regressivity of the payments for medication and medical services, which constitute 
over 80% of PHE throughout the 1980s and 1990s (CSFSNS 2007). No previous studies 
to date have provided updated figures on the progressivity of PHE. 
The introduction of fiscal benefits associated with PHE was an attempt by the 
Portuguese government to encourage consumers to purchase more private health care, 
as a means to slow down and decrease public expenditure related to health care, during 
the late 1980s. Consequently, Portugal became one of the most generous nations with 
respect to these fiscal benefits.
5
 As mentioned above, one of the reasons for the 
regressivity of the finance of health care in Portugal is due to the generosity of these 
fiscal benefits. Previous studies (Pinto and Santos 1993; Pereira and Sousa 2001; 
CSFSNS 2007) have shown that these fiscal deductions not only make income tax less 
progressive, but also it contributes to the reduction of equity in the finance of health 
care because it is the richer individuals who receive the majority of these benefits. This 
of course gives incentives to purchase more private health care. 
Moreover, these fiscal benefits are also inequitable as it only benefits individuals 
who qualify to pay income tax. CSFSNS (2007) showed that in 2000, about 44% of 
                                                 
5
 Throughout the early 1980s, 50% of certain PHE was allowed to be deducted from the tax amount owed 
by the individual. In 1987, 100% of all PHE could be deducted. The fiscal change in 1999 brought down 
the deduction rate to 30%. However, even with this decline, Portugal has one of the highest deduction 
rates related to PHE. See CSFSNS (2007) for a comparison with other nations. 
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Portuguese households, although contributed about 40% of the total PHE, were exempt 
from these benefits because of their insufficient incomes to pay tax, either because their 
incomes were too low for tax purposes or they paid no tax as a result of the “specific 
deductions” on employment and pension income.
6
 This begs the question if past policy 
considerations to address the unequal distribution of these fiscal benefits have had its 
intended impact. Oliveira and Pinto (2005) showed that the introduction of limits on 
certain PHE in 1995, and the decrease in the allowed deduction of PHE (100% down to 
30%), have had only a marginal decrease in the inequity of these fiscal benefits. 
A significant change came in 1999 when the calculation of these fiscal 
deductions was altered.
7
 This change was introduced to address the inequity of the fiscal 
benefits. However, this modification has been rarely examined. To date, CSFSNS 
(2007) demonstrated that there was a significant decrease in the inequity of these fiscal 
benefits in the year 2000, but was still a long way off to be considered an equitable 
system. Since this fiscal deduction does not depend on the income level of the 
household, which was the case before the fiscal change in 1999, the fiscal benefits 
associated with PHE should follow the distribution of PHE as a minimum requirement 
for this fiscal benefit system to be considered equitable (CSFSNS 2007). 
With the establishment of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to reduce 
public expenditures as well as the objectives set out in the Plano Nacional de Saúde 
(2010-2016), new measures have been introduced to address the inequities of the health 
sector. With respect to the fiscal deductions associated with PHE, stricter limits on such 
deductions have been implemented on richer individuals, as well as a two-thirds cut of 
                                                 
6
 “Specific deductions on income” are deductible from income prior to the calculation of tax. 
7
 Prior to 1999, the fiscal deduction was deducted from the taxable income of the taxpayer. This benefited 
richer individuals as the deduction depended on the marginal tax rate. Thus as the tax rate rose, so did the 
fiscal benefits. As a result of the new fiscal rule introduced in 1999, the fiscal deduction was deducted 
directly from the tax amount owing to the State. This way the deduction did not depend on the marginal 
tax rate, and hence neither on the income level of the household. 
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the deduction rate (from 30% to 10%).
8
 To date, no prior research has provided 
audiences about the effects of these changes as yet. 
Given the lack of recent research into the abovementioned matters, the objective 
of this work project is to answer the following question: have the fiscal benefits 
associated with PHE become more equitable? To answer this, we will look at the 
progressivity of these benefits between 2000 and 2010. Furthermore, an estimation of 
the change in these fiscal benefits in 2011 is simulated. This work project will also 
consider if the change in the fiscal tax system i.e. fewer tax brackets and higher tax 
rates, for the fiscal year 2013, will have a positive impact on the equity in these fiscal 
benefits. 
The work project is organized as follows: section II provides a brief critical 
review of previous studies with an emphasis on past empirical evidence on the equity of 
the fiscal benefits associated with PHE as well as the different measurement techniques 
used for the purpose of this work project, section III establishes the data and 
methodology used to measure equity as well as the variables used, section IV portrays 
the results and equity implications of the analysis, and finally section V concludes. 
II. Literature review 
International recognized papers, Wagstaff et al (1989), Wagstaff (1992) and 
Wagstaff et al (1999) form the benchmark of studies related to the finance of health 
care, across various nations. The methodology of concentration and progressivity 
indices used in these papers to measure the equity of the finance in health care, are the 
same tools used in this work project. To measure this equity, the method first proposed 
by Kakwani (1977) to measure the progressivity of taxes and thus, its equity can also be 
used to measure the progressivity of the finance in health care. Using these methods, the 
                                                 
8
 See Appendix A for the fiscal rules concerning the fiscal deductions associated with PHE. 
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equity of the fiscal benefits associated with PHE can likewise be measured. This 
methodology is widely used in equity analysis in various health finance papers (Pereira 
and Pinto 1992, van Doorslaer et al 1993, Pinto and Santos 1993, Pereira 1996, Parker 
and Wong 1997, Kakwani et al 1997, Pereira and Sousa 2001, CSFSNS 2007, 
O´Donnell et al 2007). 
Related to studies in respect of fiscal benefits associated with PHE, Pereira and 
Pinto (1992) study showed that Portuguese households with less income received lower 
fiscal benefits associated with PHE. Lower reimbursement rates on health products, 
submits poorer households to purchase less private health care. As a result, these 
families have less health expenses to declare as a deductible. At the same time, most 
poor households while purchasing private health care, are often exempted from paying 
taxes and therefore do not qualify for these fiscal benefits. However, no concentration 
or progressivity indices for the fiscal deduction were presented, and only assumptions 
about the progressivity of these benefits were stated in their paper. 
Pinto and Santos (1993) showed that the fiscal benefits related to PHE decreased 
the progressivity of the income tax in Portugal. The study was conducted for the year 
1989.
9
 Although this study provided audiences with important information about this 
fiscal benefit system, the study was based on a sample of tax declarations. The fact that 
Pinto and Santos (1993) did not make use of the household budget survey, they failed to 
take into account the number households who are exempt from paying taxes, and thus 
are disqualified from these benefits. This of course has an expected negative impact on 
the progressivity of these benefits, and thus further increases the inequity of these fiscal 
benefits. Moreover, its equity over time could not be observed as the study only focused 
on one time period. 
                                                 
9
 During this year, the deduction was based on taxable income therefore the deduction depended on the 
marginal tax rate. The higher the marginal tax rate, the higher will be the deduction. As a result this 
benefited the richer households where income levels were higher than that of poorer households. 
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A more comprehensive study on this matter was conducted by Pereira and Sousa 
(2001). The study was based on the Household Budget Survey for 1980 and 1990 (IOF 
1980 and 1990), and additionally Kakwani indices were applied directly on this fiscal 
deduction. Moreover, this allowed for a descriptive analysis on the progressive 
evolution of these fiscal benefits during this period. The research showed that the fiscal 
deduction associated with PHE was progressive, implying that households with higher 
income levels received more of the benefits related with the deduction. However, this 
reasoning is incorrect as “progressive” means it is pro-poor.
10
 Verbist (2004) showed 
that in order to measure the progressivity of a “tax credit”, the Gini and concentration 
indices should be swapped around to correct for the sign of the Kakwani index.
11
 
Although not a criticism of the work done in Pereira and Sousa (2001), the Kakwani 
index calculated in this work project takes into account the difference between the 
concentration indices of PHE and the fiscal benefits related to PHE, and not the 
difference between the concentration and Gini indices of these fiscal benefits and 
income, respectively, as in Pereira and Sousa (2001). The Kakwani index is computed 
in this way as a result of the change in the way the fiscal deduction related to PHE is 
formulated since 1999, as mentioned in the introduction section of this work project. 
The aforementioned alteration will be considered in the analysis here. 
The most recent analysis on the distribution of the fiscal benefits associated with 
PHE in Portugal was conducted by CSFSNS (2007). This study added on the household 
incomes and health expenses for the year 2000, and moreover included the alteration of 
the fiscal deduction. However, the paper does not provide progressivity values for these 
fiscal benefits. Thus, readers are not able to observe the extent of equity in the fiscal 
                                                 
10
 See section III for the explanation. 
11
 The fiscal deduction related to PHE can be regarded as a tax credit or tax saving. See section III for an 
explanation of how the progressivity of the fiscal deduction is measured. 
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deduction throughout the periods under study.
12
 Nevertheless, the paper does provide a 
visual representation of its distribution. It shows that the distribution of the fiscal 
benefits follows that of household income, rather than following the distribution of PHE 
for this fiscal benefit system to be considered equitable. The paper also takes into 
account households, who although contribute to the finance of health care, do not reap 
the rewards from these fiscal deductions as their incomes are not sufficient enough for 
tax purposes. This is one of the main issues that contribute to the inequity of the fiscal 
benefits related to PHE. The same approach will be used in this work project. 
III. Data, variables and methodology 
III.I Data and variables 
The data used for this work project was collected from the Household Budget 
Surveys (IOF 2000, IDEF 2005 and 2010) conducted by the National Institution of 
Statistics of Portugal (INE).
13
 From these surveys, we are able to extract the income and 
PHE values of the Portuguese families. The surveys are based on population based data, 
with representative samples of both the Portuguese mainland and the Autonomous 
Regions of the Azores and Madeira. The sampling unit used in these surveys is the 
aggregate household, and thus this analysis will be based on a comparison between 
households. The methodology in conducting these surveys is internationally based 
which allows for a comprehensive comparison with other nations. 
However the data does have limitations. Survey data may suffer from recall bias 
due to the infrequency that certain PHE are made (O´Donnell et al 2008). Moreover, tax 
payments by households are not included in all the surveys.
14
 Consequently, deriving 
the relative gross incomes of households was simulated by using the applicable tax rates 
                                                 
12
 CSFSNS (2007) uses three sets of Household Budget Surveys: 1980, 1990 and 2000. 
13
 The number of households included in the analysis was the following: 2000 – 10020; 2005 – 10403; 
2010 – 9489. 
14
 Tax payments were only included in the 2000 survey. No tax payments were present in the 2005 and 
2010 surveys. 
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and tax rebates in each year.
15
 The aforementioned method was applied to all the 
surveys under study to enhance more consistency throughout the analysis. Given the 
limitations of these surveys, these types of datasets were used by several other authors 
(Wagstaff et al 1989; Pereira and Pinto 1992; Wagstaff 1992; van Doorslaer et al 1993; 
Pereira 1996; Parker and Wong 1997; Wagstaff et al 1999; Pereira and Sousa 2001; 
CSFSNS 2007), and accordingly provides motivation to use these surveys to provide 
consistent comparisons both at a national and international level with respect to equity 
issues. Households with zero or negative incomes were excluded from the above 
analysis. 
The variables used for the analysis are, a) ability to pay defined as net household 
income, b) household PHE, and c) the fiscal deduction, which represents the fiscal 
benefits related to PHE. We consider using net household income (after deduction of 
tax payments and social security contributions) as it reflects the income available to 
households to engage in private health care payments. Household PHE consists of, a) 
medication prescriptions, b) medical appliances, c) medical services, d) hospital 
services, and e) private health insurance. 
The fiscal deduction is the amount, related to PHE, that the households are able 
to deduct from their tax liability owed to tax authorities. The values for the fiscal 
deduction were simulated according to the fiscal rules of each year.
16
 Moreover, all the 
components of PHE were assumed to be fully deductible, except for private health 
insurance where limitations are imposed.
17
 Since the surveys do not separate which 
                                                 
15
 The calculation of gross incomes is important in the context of this analysis, as limitations on the 
amount of the fiscal deduction related to PHE were imposed on higher income households starting in 
2011. These limitations depend on which gross income bracket the household belongs to. Moreover, these 
gross income brackets are also important to determine which households qualify for the fiscal deduction. 
As a result of “specific income deductions” households may not qualify for these fiscal benefits because 
of no incomes to declare for tax purposes. This is common among the poorer individuals where incomes 
are low. 
16
 See appendix A. 
17
 See appendix A. 
11 
 
PHE were purchased with a normal VAT rate, or with the special VAT rate of 6%, the 
total amount of each component of PHE was considered for the fiscal deduction. This of 
course poses a constraint on the below analysis, as there are limitations of how much 
PHE purchased with a normal VAT rate can be deducted as a fiscal deduction. 
Nevertheless, we assume that the full amount of PHE is deductible. 
Furthermore, for a thorough comparable analysis between households, all the 
variables were homogenized by adult equivalent.
18
 In past studies, only income was 
homogenized by adult equivalent, but more recent studies have now equivalised health 
payments (Wagstaff et al 1999; Pereira and Sousa 2001). Likewise, following the same 
reasoning in Wagstaff et al (1999), the fiscal deduction is also homogenized by adult 
equivalent to provide more consistency throughout the analysis. This homogenization 
allows us to compare households with different dimensions and structures. 
III.II Methodology 
Studies on the equity of finance in health care have concentrated on the 
measurement of the vertical equity i.e. to what extent do households with different 
incomes contribute differently to the finance of health care. To measure this vertical 
equity of the finance in health care, the Kakwani progressivity index has been used, 
which measures to what extent does a particular source of health finance moves away 
from proportionality.
19
 Like many other authors (Wagstaff et al 1989; van Doorslaer 
and Wagstaff 1992; Wagstaff 1992; Wagstaff et al 1999; Pereira 1996; Pereira and 
Sousa 2001; CSFSNS 2007), the Kakwani index has been used to measure the relative 
degree of progressivity in the finance of health care, and consequently the extent of 
                                                 
18
 The OCDE equivalence scale was used where the first adult of the household is given a weight of 1.0, 
the remaining adults are given a weight of 0.5, and children under the age of 14 are given a weight of 0.3. 
The OCDE equivalence scale had to be constructed for the 2000 and 2005 surveys. For the 2010 survey 
the OCDE equivalence scale constructed by INE was used for the analysis. 
19
 This index was formulated by Kakwani (1977) as a measure of tax progressivity. 
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equity in the finance of heath care. Consequently, the Kakwani index can similarly be 
used to measure the extent of equity in the fiscal benefits associated with PHE. 
To define the Kakwani index, an understanding of Gini and concentration 
indices is required. The Lorenz curve relates the cumulative percentage of households, 
ranked by income from the poorest to the richest household, against the cumulative 
percentage of household income, and in the end shows how the distribution of income 
moves away from the line of perfect equality (45-degree line running from the bottom 
left-hand corner to the top-right corner of the graph). The Gini index measures the 
magnitude of the inequality in income distribution across households. The index varies 
from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates that income is distributed equally among the households, 
and 1 when total income pertains to one household. 
Likewise, we can define concentration curves and indices to measure the 
distribution of PHE and the fiscal deductions. The concentration curve plots the 
cumulative percentage of a health variable against the cumulative percentage of 
households, ranked by a living standards measure (income), beginning with the poorest 
and ending with the richest. If the curve is below (above) the line of perfect equality, the 
health variable of interest takes on higher (lower) values among the rich. The 
concentration index measures the magnitude of the degree of income-related inequality 
in a health variable. This index varies between -1 and 1. If the index is -1, the poorest 
household supports the total value of the health variable, and when the index is 1, the 
richest household sustains the entire health variable. Moreover, if the index is 0, there is 
no income-related inequality. 
The Kakwani index is defined as the difference between the concentration index 
and the Gini index: 
                                                                                                                                          ( ) 
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where    is the concentration index, and    is the Gini index. 
In the context of the finance in health care, when     , health care finance is 
proportional i.e. all the households contribute to the finance of health care in equal 
proportion in relation to their income. When     , health care finance is progressive 
i.e. the percentage of health payments increases, as income increases (thus it is pro-
poor), and when      health care finance is regressive i.e. the percentage of health 
payments decreases, as income increases (accordingly it is pro-rich). 
The above is the conventional method used to measure the progressivity of 
health payments (Wagstaff et al 1989; Wagstaff 1992; Wagstaff et al 1999; Pereira and 
Sousa 2001; CSFSNS 2007). However, the derivation of the Kakwani index for the 
fiscal benefits is somewhat different. Given the fact that the fiscal deduction does not 
depend on the household´s income level but rather PHE, a modification is done on 
equation (1) when measuring the progressivity of the fiscal deduction. In this case, the 
Kakwani index of this fiscal deduction is adjusted to the difference between the 
concentration indices of PHE and the fiscal benefits associated with PHE: 
                                                                                                                                       ( ) 
where     and      are the concentration indices of PHE and the fiscal benefits, 
respectively.
20
 
A positive Kakwani index of the fiscal deduction indicates that the fiscal benefits 
related to PHE goes relatively more to the lower end of the income distribution, and is 
thus pro-poor. A negative Kakwani index indicates that the fiscal deduction is pro-rich. 
All the variables were adjusted for constant prices (base year being 2010). 
STATA 12 was used as the statistical software program for the above analysis. Gini and 
                                                 
20
 Verbist (2004) showed that to measure the progressivity of a tax credit, the sign of the Kakwani index 
should be reversed. Equation (2) above takes into account this modification. 
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concentration indices were calculated according to the “convenient regression” method 
(Kakwani, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 1997). Consequently, 
   
 (
  
 
)                                                                                                                      ( ) 
where   
  is the variance of the fractional rank,    is the health variable, and   is the 
health variable´s mean. The OLS estimate of   is thus the estimate of the concentration 
index. The concentration index is therefore determined firstly by, ranking the 
households according to income, sorting it from the poorest to the richest household and 
applying sample weights to get the fractional rank for each household. Secondly, we 
obtain the variance of the fractional rank and multiply it by two and the health variable, 
and divide by the mean value of the health variable. Finally, we regress the result in the 
second step with the fractional rank to obtain the   estimate. 
A Kakwani index is the difference between the concentration index and the Gini 
index. Bearing this in mind, we can adopt the “convenient regression” method used for 
concentration indices, and apply it to the calculation of a Kakwani index. Accordingly, 
   
 (
  
  
 
  
  
)                                                                                                           ( ) 
where    is the mean value of the health variable,    is income, and    is the mean 
value of income. By the applying the same steps as above, we obtain the   value which 
is an estimate of the Kakwani index.
21
 
IV. Results 
This section is divided into three parts. First, results are presented on the 
progressivity and thus its equity, of PHE between 2000 and 2010, comparing with 
earlier studies and furthermore examines if the situation has improved. Secondly, the 
                                                 
21
 Note that for the calculation of the Kakwani index for the fiscal deduction, we consider the difference 
of the concentration indices between PHE and the fiscal benefits associated with PHE, as mentioned 
earlier. 
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equity in the fiscal benefits related to PHE is presented for the same period, with 
comparisons with earlier research in Portugal and furthermore analyzes if these fiscal 
benefits have become more equitable. Finally, the simulation is conducted on the 
reduction of the new fiscal benefits according to the MoU. 
IV.I Private health expenses 
Figure 2 below illustrates the Kakwani indices of PHE for Portugal, as well as 
other European nations and the United States. During the 1980s and 1990s, the 
regressivity of PHE in Portugal was relatively high compared to other European nations. 
Moreover, this trend has maintained through the 2000s. The main reason driving this 
regressivity is the payments towards medication, which have had progressivity indices 
below -0.30 over the last three decades.
22
 Not only are the poorer households the ones 
with the greatest need of health care but according to Pinto and Miguel (2006), Portugal 
has had one of the lowest compensation rates for medication over the years. 
Furthermore, the payments towards medication constitute nearly 50% of total PHE over 
the last decade across all households, with medication spending reaching over 65% of 
total PHE among the poorest households. This explains not only the high proportion of 
PHE in Portugal, but also why a significant portion of total medication spending rests 
on poorer households. Consequently, 20% of the poorest households support 26.34%, 
23.05% and 21.41% of the payments towards medication, respectively for the years 
2000, 2005 and 2010.
23
 Another reason for this observed regressivity is due to the 
inequity of the fiscal benefits associated with these payments. 
                                                 
22
 See appendix B for the progressivity indices of the other components of PHE. 
23
 See appendix C for the other components of PHE. 
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Source: Own calculations.
24
 Note, a negative Kakwani index: pro-rich. 
IV.II Fiscal benefits associated with PHE 
We first look at the impact the several changes imposed on the fiscal benefits 
related to PHE has had on households throughout the years. Figure 3 below shows the 
percentage of PHE that households have recovered per income decile i.e. the percentage 
of PHE that households were able to deduct from their tax liability, throughout the 
decades. During the 1980s, only 1% of PHE were recovered by households.
25
 The 
inclusion of all PHE to be fully deductible (100%) in 1987, improved the situation. 
However the most significant change came after 1999 where not only did the percentage 
of recuperated PHE increase from 14% in 1990 to about 22% throughout the 2000s, but 
also there was a significant increase for the poorer households. This was due to the 
switch to a tax credit benefit system which did not rely on the amount of income earned 
by the household. Even though this change benefited significantly poorer households in 
comparison to years past, when compared with the richer income deciles, the lower 
income households are still a long way off from achieving these higher percentages. 
                                                 
24
 Values for nations marked with # were taken from Pereira (1996). Figures for nations marked with * 
were taken from Wagstaff et al (1999). 
25
 The main reason for this was due to the fact that only certain PHE was eligible for deduction purposes, 
as well as 50% of these PHE was deductible. 
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Figure 2: Kakwani indices for PHE 
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Furthermore, 20% of the poorest households received only 6.97%, 4.59% and 5.54% of 
the total benefits for years 2000, 2005 and 2010 respectively.
26
 This is of concern, 
especially if the new change in the fiscal deduction in 1999 was meant to vastly 
improve the equity in the fiscal benefits, regardless of how much income the household 
earned. 
Source: Own calculations.
27 
To see why the fiscal benefits related with PHE have still remained inequitable, 
below Figures 4 and 5 depicts the Lorenz and concentration curves of income, PHE and 
the fiscal deduction, respectively for the years 2005 and 2010.
28
 These curves 
demonstrate the distribution of income, PHE and the fiscal deduction across households 
ordered from the poorest to the richest. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 See appendix C. 
27
 The percentages for years 1980 and 1990 were taken from Pereira and Sousa (2001). 
28
 Own elaboration. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
*1980 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1
*1990 1 2 5 7 9 10 15 17 22 27 14
2000 7 9 14 15 20 23 26 27 29 30 22
2005 4 7 11 15 19 22 23 26 29 29 21
2010 6 9 11 16 19 24 26 29 29 30 22
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Figure 3: Percentage of recuperated PHE per income decile 
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 Figure 4              Figure 5 
For this fiscal benefit system to be equitable, the distribution of the fiscal 
deduction (blue curve) should follow the distribution of PHE (green curve), as the way 
the fiscal deduction is calculated, it does not depend on how much income the 
households earn but rather on how much private health care is purchased by households. 
Nonetheless, the figures above illustrates that this is not the case. 
Table 1: Kakwani indices *1980 *1990 2000 2005 2010 
Fiscal deduction -0.328 -0.218 -0.197 -0.231 -0.213 
Source: Own calculations.
29
 Note: a negative Kakwani index: pro-rich. 
Table 1 above displays the Kakwani indices for the fiscal deduction throughout 
the last three decades in Portugal. Although the resgressivity has dropped from -0.328 in 
1980 to -0.213 in 2010, the fiscal benefits associated with PHE still remains regressive 
and thus the system remains inequitable i.e. it is pro-rich as the fiscal benefits goes 
relatively more to the higher end of the income distribution. 
IV.III Simulation of reduction in fiscal benefits imposed by the MoU 
To see the effects of the change in the fiscal benefits related to PHE imposed by 
the MoU, an equity analysis of this alteration is conducted, conditional on the old 2011 
tax system and the new 2013 tax system. Below in Table 2, eight sets of concentration 
and Kakwani indices are provided (each set is numbered 1 to 8 in brackets). Set 1 
                                                 
29
 Kakwani indices for years 1980 and 1990 were taken from Pereira and Sousa (2001). For ease of 
understanding and correctness, the Kakwani indices for 1980 and 1990 were reserved. 
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provides us with values based on the deduction of only 30% of PHE conditional on the 
old tax system. Set 2 demonstrates indices based on the deduction of only 10% (plus 0% 
to households belonging to the top two income brackets) of PHE conditional on the old 
tax system. In set 3, the indices are based on the deduction of only 30% of PHE 
conditional on the new tax system. Set 4 depicts values based on the deduction of 10% 
(plus 0% to households in the top income bracket) of PHE conditional on the new tax 
system. 
Sets five to eight, incorporate the limits imposed on these deductions according 
to which tax bracket the household belongs to. Set 5 shows indices based on the 
deduction of 30% (plus limits of 1100 euros to households in the top two income 
brackets) of PHE conditional on the old tax system. In set 6, the values depicted are 
based on the deduction of 10% (plus 0% to households in the top two income brackets, 
a limit of 1100 to households in the third top income bracket, a limit of 1150 in the 
fourth top income bracket, a limit of 1200 in the fifth top income bracket, and a limit of 
1250 to households in the sixth top income bracket) of PHE conditional on the old tax 
system. Set 7 reveals indices based on the deduction of 30% (plus a limit of 1100 euros 
to households in the top income bracket) of PHE conditional on the new tax system. 
Finally, set 8 shows values based on the deduction of 10% (plus 0% to households in 
the top income bracket, a limit of 500 in the second top income bracket, a limit of 1000 
in the third top income bracket, and a limit of 1250 to households in the fourth top 
income bracket) of PHE conditional on the new tax system. 
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Table 2 Old 2011 tax system New 2013 tax system 
Effect of % change only Concentration index Kakwani index Concentration index Kakwani index 
30% (1)  0.363 (1)  -0.213 (3)  0.271 (3)  -0.122 
10% + 0% (2)  0.310 (2)  -0.160 (4)  0.234 (4)  -0.085 
     
Effect of % change and limits 
    
30% + limits (5)   0.349 (5)  -0.199 (7)   0.262 (7)  -0.112 
10% + limits (6)  -0.187 (6)   0.336 (8)  -0.185 (8)   0.335 
Source: Own calculations.
30
 
Considering only the effect of the percentage change (sets 1 to 4) conditional on 
the old and new tax system, we observe a decline in the concentration index of 0.363 to 
0.310, and 0.271 to 0.234, respectively. This decline is due to the 0% deduction on 
richer households, rather than the two-thirds cut of the percentage deductible on PHE. 
In fact simulating a drop from 30% to 10% across the entire distribution of households, 
the concentration index increased slightly.
31
 The Kakwani indices show that conditional 
on either system, the fiscal deduction becomes more progressive but still remains 
regressive (pro-rich). The higher Kakwani indices, conditional on the new tax system, 
are a result of the lower specific deductions on income. Consequently, more households 
qualify for the deduction related to PHE, and accordingly receive more of the fiscal 
benefits. 
Allowing for the effect of the limits on the deduction of PHE (sets 5 to 8) we 
observe a more profound decline in the concentration indices; conditional on the old and 
the new tax system, the value drops from 0.349 to -0.187, and 0.262 to -0.185, 
respectively. As a result of a change in these fiscal benefits, the Kakwani indices, 
conditional on either tax system, estimates that the fiscal deduction will become 
progressive (-0.199 to 0.336, and -0.112 to 0.335, respectively). This decline in inequity 
                                                 
30
 Note: a positive concentration index indicates that the benefits are distributed more towards the richer 
households. A positive Kakwani index indicates that the benefits goes relatively more to the lower end of 
the income distribution and thus its pro-poor.  
31
 Conditional on the old and the new tax system, the concentration index increased from 0.363 to 0.365, 
and 0.271 to 0.273, respectively. However this does not reflect the true change as households belonging 
to the top income bracket have zero deductions on PHE according to the new fiscal benefits. 
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of the fiscal benefits is a direct cause of the new strict limits imposed on the deduction 
on the higher income earning households. 
An interesting point is that although the lower specific deductions on income 
allows more households to qualify for the deduction of PHE, the change to the new tax 
system with fewer tax brackets, actually slightly deters the progressivity of the fiscal 
deduction. Looking at sets 5 and 7, we see an increase of the Kakwani index. This is a 
result of lower specific deductions on income under the new tax system, and thus more 
households qualifying for the deduction. However, if we observe sets 6 and 8, the 
Kakwani index is the practically the same. This is a result of the fewer tax brackets in 
the new tax system. The fewer tax brackets imply that more households are more prone 
to the limitations on their deductions, and thus deter the progressivity of the fiscal 
deduction. 
Nevertheless, overall the change from the old fiscal benefits to the new fiscal 
benefits, we observe that the fiscal deduction was pro-rich (Kakwani index -0.199) 
during 2011 and we can predict that the fiscal deduction will convert to pro-poor 
(Kakwani index 0.335) during 2013. We thus expect a vast improvement in the inequity 
of the fiscal benefits associated with PHE. 
V. Conclusion 
This work project aimed to answer the question about the extent of equity in the 
fiscal benefits associated with PHE. Using the methodology of Kakwani indices, one 
may conclude that during the 2000s, the fiscal deduction has remained regressive and 
inequitable. Even though there was a drop in the deduction rate from 100% in 1987 to 
30% in 1999, the richer households are still able to deduct more of their health expenses 
than the poorer individuals as a result of no limits imposed on these deductions for the 
rich. Moreover, there has been an increase of the limits associated with payments 
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towards private health insurance between 2000 and 2010. Thus richer households are 
able to deduct more of these expenses and in turn receive more benefits. Furthermore, 
there has been an increase in the specific deductions on employment income, and not to 
mention the specific deductions on pension income. Not only do households with 
insufficient income to declare taxes are exempt from these fiscal benefits, but also 
households who declare their income often do not pay taxes as a result of these specific 
deductions. All of the above have contributed to the inequity of these fiscal benefits. 
Although the fiscal change of these benefits in 1999 did in fact reduce the inequity of 
such benefits, it still remains regressive thus still contributing to the inequity in the 
finance of private health care payments. 
This work project also provided with a simulation of the reduction in the new 
fiscal benefits implemented in 2011. The analysis estimated that the fiscal deduction 
was pro-rich in 2011, and predicts that the fiscal benefits related to PHE will become 
pro-poor in 2013, and hence a vast improvement in the inequity of such benefits that we 
have seen in the past. This is mainly credited to the strict limits imposed on the 
deduction for richer households. We can thus assume that richer households will in the 
future restrict their private health spending which in turn will reduce the inequity in the 
payments towards private health care, and hence the total finance in health care in 
Portugal. However, caution must be noted here as the simulation of this change in fiscal 
benefits was simulated using the income and PHE figures for 2010. Future research is 
necessary using updated data to see if the analysis done in this work project reflects the 
expected effects to address the inequity of the fiscal benefits associated with PHE. 
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Appendix A 
Fiscal rules 2000 2005 2010 2011 2013 
Amount of PHE allowed for deduction 30% 30% 30% 30% 10% 
Amount of private health insurance allowed for deduction 25% 25% 30% 30% 10% 
Limits on PHE None None None 1100 0 
Limits on private health insurance *51/#102 *76/#152 *85/#170 *85/#170 *50/#100 
Specific deductions on employment income 2749 euros 3237 euros 4104 euros 4104 euros 4104 euros 
Specific deductions on pensions 7410 euros 8283 euros 6000 euros 6000 euros 4104 euros 
Note1: values marked with * indicate a limit on non-married households; values marked with # indicate a limit on married 
households. 
Note2: “Limits on PHE” for 2011 indicate a limit of 1100 euros for households belonging to the top two income brackets, while for 
2013 a limit of 0 euros is imposed on households in the top income bracket. 
 
Appendix B 
Kakwani indices 1980 1990 2000 2005 2010 
Medication -0.332 -0.322 -0.344 -0.344 -0.325 
Medical appliances  -0.030 -0.063 -0.125 -0.068 -0.143 
Medical services -0.028 -0.040 -0.093 -0.080 -0.052 
Hospital services 0.199 0.164 0.003 0.167 0.142 
Private health insurance 0.131 0.197 0.279 0.246 0.140 
Total private health expenses -0.201 -0.166 -0.200 -0.185 -0.180 
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Appendix C 
2000         
Equivalent Equivalent Medication Medical Medical Hospital Private Total private Fiscal 
household household 
 
appliances services services health health deduction 
income quintile income         insurance expenses   
poorest 20% 9.41 26.34 12.67 11.71 4.27 0.96 17.92 6.97 
poorest 40% 22.02 48.73 29.4 31.13 18.61 9.21 38.00 20.29 
poorest 60% 36.93 66.66 47.28 45.09 39.04 14.68 54.33 36.28 
poorest 80% 55.75 82.35 66.46 63.98 63.96 26.41 71.97 57.67 
Concentration index 0.363 0.020 0.238 0.271 0.367 0.642 0.164 0.361 
robust std err 0.007 0.018 0.037 0.032 0.097 0.097 0.018 0.022 
pvalue 0 0.272 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kakwani index 
 
-0.344 -0.125 -0.093 0.003 0.279 -0.200 -0.197 
robust std err 
 
0.019 0.037 0.031 0.097 0.096 0.018 0.022 
pvalue 
 
0 0.001 0.003 0.971 0.004 0 0.91 
 
2005         
Equivalent Equivalent Medication Medical Medical Hospital Private Total private Fiscal 
household household 
 
appliances services services health health deduction 
income quintile income         insurance expenses   
poorest 20% 8.43 23.05 10.16 11.07 4.33 1.52 16.18 4.59 
poorest 40% 21.08 45.36 24.02 23.9 8.94 7.01 33.09 15.23 
poorest 60% 36.45 62.17 42.59 42.26 17.8 18.59 50.08 32.14 
poorest 80% 57.62 80.59 65.3 65.93 49.22 36.75 71.35 57.5 
Concentration index 0.352 0.008 0.284 0.272 0.518 0.597 0.167 0.398 
robust std err 0.008 0.016 0.028 0.022 0.131 0.069 0.015 0.020 
pvalue 0 0.615 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kakwani index 
 
-0.344 -0.068 -0.080 0.167 0.246 -0.185 -0.231 
robust std err 
 
0.018 0.029 0.023 0.130 0.067 0.016 0.020 
pvalue 
 
0 0.019 0.001 0.202 0 0 0.022 
 
2010         
Equivalent Equivalent Medication Medical Medical Hospital Private Total private Fiscal 
household household 
 
appliances services services health health deduction 
income quintile income         insurance expenses   
poorest 20% 8.75 21.41 15.62 10.93 3.49 5.34 15.98 5.54 
poorest 40% 22.22 42.72 32.37 24.81 14.48 13.88 33.44 16.67 
poorest 60% 38.89 64.37 48.96 40.86 30.79 25.39 52.15 35.38 
poorest 80% 59.67 82.7 70.87 65.65 49.98 48.2 73.34 61.96 
Concentration index 0.330 0.005 0.187 0.278 0.471 0.469 0.149 0.363 
robust std err 0.006 0.013 0.048 0.025 0.114 0.045 0.014 0.018 
pvalue 0 0.727 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kakwani index 
 
-0.325 -0.143 -0.052 0.142 0.140 -0.180 -0.213 
robust std err 
 
0.015 0.048 0.026 0.113 0.045 0.015 0.019 
pvalue 
 
0 0.003 0.047 0.212 0.002 0 0.085 
